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Abstract In practice, water pricing is the main economic instrument used to discour-
age the wasteful use of residential water. Owing to considerations of affordability,
residential water is systematically underpriced because water is essential for life. Such
a low price results in water being used inefficiently. This paper proposes a system that
supplements the existing price system with a cap-and-trade measure to reconcile
conflicts among the goals of residential water use. It forces all people (independent
of income) to be faced with reasonable price signals and to use water efficiently. The
poor could, however, gain from trade and afford water. By taking advantage of the
agent-based model, a simulation of this system applied to Taipei, Taiwan shows that
those with lower income per capita are better off under this system even though the
equilibrium price of residential water is higher. The simulated average price elasticity
of market demand is −0.449.
Keywords Residential water . Efficiency . Affordability . Water pricing . Cap and trade .
Price elasticity . Agent-based model
1 Introduction
Water is essential for life. The supply of water is, however, insufficient and it is becoming
increasingly scarce in terms of meeting all of the demand for it (WWDR2 2006). Since the
water supply for domestic use in general takes priority over other water usages, other water
uses will be inefficient if residential water is not used efficiently. Thus, this paper will focus
on the demand-side management and estimation in the case of residential water among all
water uses.
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Around the world, water pricing is the main economic incentive instrument used to
charge for residential water and to discourage its wasteful use.1 There is a large literature
that has studied the estimation of residential water demand and has mainly focused on the
estimation of price elasticity. Different issues regarding the estimation have been explored,
including the following topics: whether the average or the marginal price combined with the
difference variable should be used as the price variable in the demand equation (see, e.g.,
Taylor 1975; Nordin 1976; Foster and Beattie 1979, 1981a, b; Billings and Agthe 1980;
Billings 1982; Nieswiadomy and Molina 1989; Nieswiadomy 1992; Renwick and Archibald
1998; Shin 1985; Opaluch 1982, 1984; Taylor et al. 2004), model specification and
functional forms of the demand equation (linear, logarithmic, Stone-Geary, or discrete/
continuous choice models among others) (see, e.g., Gaudin et al. 2001; Martínez-
Espiñeira and Nauges 2004; Hewitt and Hanemann 1995; Olmstead et al. 2007; Olmstead
2009), the meta-analysis of various research estimates (Espey et al. 1997; Dalhuisen et al.
2003), and country case studies (see, e.g., Martínez-Espiñeira 2003; Reynaud et al. 2005;
Schleich and Hillenbrand 2009; Miyawaki et al. 2011; Dharmaratna and Harris 2012;
Rinaudo et al. 2012). In comparison with the above research, the literature that is directed
towards institutional reforms of residential water management is relatively small and mainly
focuses on the pricing system design (see e.g., Elnaboulsi 2001; Hall 2001; Boland and
Whittington 2001; Krause et al. 2003; García-Valiñas 2005; Barberán and Arbués 2009).
Charging for water serves multiple purposes regarding water use, including the user
pays principle, equity and efficiency in water use, an increase in quality, the financial
soundness of the water utility, and affordability for the poor. However, these purposes
are not reconciled. For example, a higher price may increase the efficiency of water
use and utility revenue, but it may also make water unaffordable to the poor. Owing
to the consideration of affordability and the pressure from the demand side, water is
“systematically underpriced by suppliers” (Griffin 2006) and the price cannot reflect
all the costs of producing it. The lower price causes water to be used inefficiently and
renders its production costs irrecoverable.
Differing from the above reforms in the use of pricing systems, this paper proposes a
price-cum-trade incentive system (PTS hereafter) to reconcile the multiple purposes of
residential water use (in particular efficiency and affordability). Nowadays, cross-
subsidization is generally applied by the regulator to harmonize the dilemma. Under this
measure, the water utility charges low income groups and most residences below-average
rates, but charges industrial and commercial users above-average rates to make up the
difference. There are, however, some problems which may arise from the cross-
subsidization. First, a cross-subsidy policy sends wrong signals to both the utility and
consumers. The over-consumption by subsidized customers and the loss of sales to the
subsidizing customers are both inefficient and result in welfare losses to the society. Second,
such a policy violates the principle of fairness. In addition, cross-subsidization frequently
1 “Two scarcity-addressing strategies dear to water resource economists are water marketing and water
pricing. Marketing is a management policy for natural water, whereas pricing pertains to partially- or fully-
processed (retail) water.” (Griffin 2006, p. 203). There are many existing rate systems for water utilities both
in theory and practice such as flat pricing, marginal cost (MC) pricing, average cost (AC) pricing, the rate-of-
return regulation, Ramsey pricing, peak-load pricing, block-rate pricing, price-cap regulation, spot market
pricing, and effective water pricing. In general, if the pricing system has or tends to have the characteristic of
MC pricing, it results in a higher economic efficiency. However, because the water utility is basically a natural
monopoly, it will experience a loss under MC pricing and will exit the market in the long run. Instead, if the
pricing system has or tends to have the characteristic of AC pricing, the natural monopoly will not experience
a loss, but the economic efficiency of the society will be lower. In addition, the water utility might produce
water inefficiently because its costs can be recovered anyway.
276 M.-F. Hung, B.-T. Chie
leads to serious financial losses for utility companies. Although raising tariffs is an option, it
is difficult in practice to set cost recovery tariffs.
The PTS is based on the existing price-incentive system but also allows the water users to
trade the water rights to which they are entitled. In theory, price and the right market are both
economic-incentive instruments and can be used individually to attain the optimality under
certainty. While pricing is mainly used for residential water management, marketing is
applied for natural water management. Several countries, such as the United States,
Australia, Chile, and South Africa, have adopted the water market as an alternative to water
allocation (Hadjigeorgalis 2009). In addition, the system of a right market is also widely
applied for managing various pollutants and renewable resources.2 However, due to the
constraints, imperfections, and uncertainty in the real world and the possible multiple
failures or purposes, a policy mix (the use of multiple policies) may be superior to single
policies. Hybrid policies have been studied in the literature for many years. Roberts and
Spence (1976) and Weitzman (1978) are, for example, two important early works. For the
rationales and examples, one can see the survey of Lehmann (2012).
By combining the pricing and cap-and-trade systems, the PTS has the following positive
characteristics. First, a cap design of residential water is used to take environmental
sustainability into consideration.3 Second, the allocation of initial water rights to individuals
can be used to take equity into account. Third, trading forces everyone, independent of
income, to face the market equilibrium price—the right price signal for water. However, the
affordability problem disappears. This is because the one who uses less water than what is
entitled to use can earn money by selling extra water at the market price. A poor person can
either save water to sell and make money, or he can pay the existing price to use the water to
which he is entitled (he is no worse off than under a pure price system). In addition, because
the poor and water-saving people can earn money, the problems of resistance to a higher
water price and systematic under-pricing are alleviated. Fourth, under the PTS, the market
equilibrium price can adjust on its own quickly and flexibly to reflect changes in the scarcity
of water. However, under the price system the regulator needs to have perfect information in
order to set the optimal price system and these prices are not easily adjustable. Fifth, the
water utility could benefit by drawing a share of the trade balance as its revenue.
In this paper, we also use a survey data set at the household level for Taipei to specify an
agent-based model in order to study the application of the PTS system.4 By using the agent-
based model, we simulate the market equilibrium price of residential water and discuss the
change of the income distribution of households. The simulated data for price and quantity
are further used to estimate the price elasticity of market water demand. These research
results are seldom studied in existing papers and can provide insights for residential water
management.
2 For example, the Kyoto Protocol introduced three market-based mechanisms (Emissions Trading (ET), the
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), and Joint Implementation (JI)) which created the carbon market.
Many countries apply the cap-and-trade system to control their CO2 emissions. The emissions trading markets
are also implemented for SO2 and NOx control in the US (see the Acid Rain Program and the Regional Clean
Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM)). In addition, for the promotion of renewable power, a renewable portfolio
standard (RPS) which specifies targets and deadlines for producing specific proportions of electricity from
renewable resources coupled with transferable energy certificates (TEC) which could lower compliance costs
is applied in the EU and US. There are also advocates for applying the cap-and-trade system for fishery. This
could be done by first setting a strict catch limit and distributing total catch shares to fishermen. Fishermen can
then buy and sell their shares.
3 Regarding the discussion of the environmental sustainability of residential water, see Krause et al. (2003).
4 For more information regarding the agent-based modeling, please visit this website (http://www.econ.iastate.edu/
tesfatsi/).
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In the next section, we shall describe the design of the price-cum-trade incentive system and
analyze its characteristics of efficiency and affordability. In Section 3, the agent-based PTS
model is specified. The price elasticity of residential water demand is estimated and the post-
trading income distribution of households is explored. In Section 4, a further analysis on the
application and viability of the PTS is discussed. Lastly, in Section 5 we provide the conclusion.
2 The Price-cum-Trade Incentive System
We design the PTS as follows:
1. Suppose that under the existing price system, the unit water price is P0.
5
2. The minimal level of water supply for basic life support per capita, the basic water
requirement, is q , which cannot be traded.
3. Suppose that the cap of residential water is Q , which is converted to a corresponding
amount of water rights.6
4. The regulator allocates Q to individual water users, who are denoted by i01,…,n.
Suppose that each individual water user obtains qi units of rights,
Pn
i¼1
qi ¼ Q . It should
be noted that qi is a usufructuary right. By this we mean that qi is not a property right.
Awater user should pay the unit price P0 to enjoy the water to which he is entitled by the
right.
5. Individual water users can trade qi with each other freely. When the market equilibrium
price P* > P0, the user who sells his usufructuary rights can earn a profit from the price
spread (P* − P0).
6. The compliance condition for an individual water user at the end of each period is:
q  the amount of water he consumed  the amount of water rights he owns:
Let us examine the PTS in detail. First, Q is the cap for residential water which is usually
determined by the total amount of water rights for residential use. Q can be used to consider
the environmental value and sustainable use of water as well. When water is scarcer, for
example, the regulator could set a smaller amount of Q . The market equilibrium price will
therefore be higher and reflect the scarcity of water. In general, the existing price systems
could not reflect the actual value of water appropriately and flexibly. The initial allocation of
Q is related to the income distribution but unrelated to efficiency. For household water
consumption, the initial quantity might be allocated equally to every person.7 Of course,
every society could apply its own appropriate approach to allocate water.
Second, water is systematically underpriced in practice regardless of the price systems
adopted. The PTS can, however, help force everyone to face a higher market price while the
poor are made better off. This is demonstrated in Fig. 1, which is a simple example with two
water users. In Fig. 1, the demand curves for water for users 1 and 2 (D1 and D2) are drawn
5 For simplification, we adopt a flat price case for ease of explanation. Different rate structures can be applied
as well.
6 Suppose that one unit of water rights deserves one unit of water.
7 It should be noted that residential water demand is influenced by the household size and there might be a
phenomenon of scale economies in consumption. That is, the increase in water use is often less than
proportional to the increase in household size (see, e.g., Arbués et al. 2003 and Arbués et al. 2010). Thus,
if the scale economies exist, equal allocation would benefit people who live in large households over those in
small households.
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from the left-hand and right-hand axes, respectively. The cap of residential water is Q and
the existing unit water price is P0. At P0, the quantities of water demanded by users 1 and 2
are q10 and q
2
0 , respectively. It is easily seen that q
1
0 þ q20 > Q . Supposing that Q is an
appropriate amount of water which takes into account the sustainable use, the above
inequality then indicates that the price of residential water is not sufficiently high to allow
the water to be used efficiently.
If the regulator somehow allocates Q equally to users 1 and 2, i.e., q1 ¼ q2 ¼ Q 2= , at the
quotaQ 2= , the marginal willingness to pay of user 2 (A2) is higher than that of user 1 (A1). Both
users therefore have an incentive to trade. The trading would take place until the marginal
willingness to pay of each user is equal. At pointQ*, thewater market is in equilibrium. If user 1
is poor, we see that he could earn a profit of P*  P0
 
Q 2=  q11
  
by saving and selling
water. A very important part of the trade is that both the rich and the poor face the correct price
signal and both gain from trade. A correct signal would force people to use water efficiently and
save water. In addition, the regulator does not need any information to set the equilibrium price.
This is, however, a difficult task under a pure price system.8
In the long run, because people would improve their household appliances to save water,
the total amount of water used by the society will decrease. Moreover, the water industry
might possibly be further developed because of the commonly active water saving behavior
of people.9
3 The Agent-based PTS Model
In this section, we will specify an agent-based PTS model based on a survey data set at the
household level. We will first describe the data set and use the Stone-Geary utility function
to take into account major demand variables including the water price, income, the
P 
*P
0P
Q2/Q11q
2
1q
User 1  0 
0   User 2 
1D
2D
*Q
1
0q
2
0q
2A
1A
Q
Fig. 1 The equilibrium of the water market
8 Existing rates are generally dependent on historical data and are very difficult to adjust to reflect the current
situations because of the considerations of affordability for the poor, political commitments, and pressure from
water users (the pressure is even higher when the overall economic situation is aggravated).
9 Governments usually apply measures which encourage the renewal of water-saving facilities in government
and schools to help save water and to promote the water industry. Such measures do not influence people’s
customs when using water, however. People are only passive when saving water and the development of the
water industry heavily depends on subsidies from the government.
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subsistence level of water use, and household characteristics. The estimated water demand
equation is then used to calibrate the water use behavior of the household. The discussions of
equilibrium, income distribution, and price elasticity follow thereafter.
3.1 Data Description
The data used in this paper consist of the original sampling data from the “Report on the Family
Income and Expenditure Survey” in Taipei, Taiwan.10 The survey is a nationwide questionnaire
completed annually by Taiwan’s central and local governments and contains data on income,
household characteristics, and water expenditure, etc., all at the household level. It is interesting
to study the case of Taiwan because water is in fact a scarce resource in Taiwan and thus ought
to be used very efficiently.11 The price system for residential water is, however, one that is
under-priced and has not been adjusted since 1994. The lower water price system not only
results in inefficient water use, but the goals of financial soundness in terms of water utility,
equity, and environmental sustainability can not as a result be attained.12
In the whole original sample, we use the data of Taipei City for the year 2005. This is
mainly because, first, almost all people in Taipei are served by tap water (the percentage of
population served was 99.5 % in 2005). Second, the survey in 2005 is the most newly-
accessible and reliable sample for water use behavior. After 2005, the reported water
expenditure includes both payments for tap water and certified trash bags so that an
empirical researcher cannot distinguish between them. Since the price system for residential
water has been frozen for almost two decades, behavior in terms of residential water use may
have changed little in recent years.
Based on this survey, after removing missing data and outliers we have data for 1,985
households. Due to the fact that water billing accumulates bimonthly, we rescale our data
into bimonthly form. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of average price and
bimonthly disposable income, water expenditure, and water consumption.13 It is worth
noting that the expenditure-income ratio is relatively low in Taipei.
3.2 The Stone-Geary Demand Function
In the literature, linear, double log, and Stone-Geary functional forms are the most commonly
employed specifications of demand functions. While the linear demand function is easy to
10 Taiwan is a newly-industrialized Asian economy with a population of 22.77 million persons and a GDP per
capita based on purchasing-power-parity (PPP) of US$ 27,572.22 in 2005 (see the World Economic Outlook
Database, International Monetary Fund). Taipei is its capital.
11 Taiwan is mountainous and the distributions of rainfall and runoff are very uneven. Rivers are also
relatively short and steep so that the precipitation is very hard to store for subsequent utilization. The
groundwater is overused which has resulted in the problem of land subsidence in some places. Since there
is a large population, the annual available water per capita (TARWR per capita 2005) in Taiwan is only
2,930 m3/year (see Table 4.3 in WWDR2 2006).
12 The amount of water used in Taipei is 340 l per capita per day, which is the 9th highest amount among
approximately 100 cities surveyed by IWA (2010).
13 The figures for water consumption are calculated from the data on water expenditure and the rate structure
in Taipei. The rates (NT$/M3, monthly per household) are 5, 5.2, 5.7, 6.5, and 7.6 for water consumption
blocks of 1–20, 21–60, 61–200, 201–1000, and 1001+ cubic meters, respectively. There are two data adjust-
ments that should be noted. First, in practice, a sewer fee of NT$5 is charged for each cubic meter of water
consumption in addition to the unit fee of water. This sewer fee is considered in this paper. Second, the
magnitude of the fixed cost is related to the diameter of the water meter. Because we don’t have this data for
each household, we assume that the diameter form of the meter applied by all households is 20 mm, the most
popular form in Taipei.
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estimate and the estimated coefficients of income and price represent elasticities in double-log
functional form, one of the advantages of the Stone-Geary function is that a minimum amount
of water demand, irrespective of prices, can be estimated. This amount of water is viewed as the
estimate of the subsistence level or the basic water requirement. Since this is a key piece of
information which represents the quantity of q that is not allowed to be traded under the PTS,
we will apply the Stone-Geary utility function form to derive the demand for water equation.
The Stone-Geary utility function is
U ¼ qw  gwð Þa qy  gy
 1a
; ð1Þ
where U denotes the level of utility, qw and qy are respectively the consumption of water and
the composite good, α is the ratio of water expenditure to disposable income, and γw and γy
represent the subsistence consumptions of water and the composite good, respectively. In
considering the individual household disposable income I, water price pw, the price of the
composite good py, and utility function 1, we derive the following optimal consumption
bundle of water:
qw ¼ gw þ
a
pw
I 
X
8k
pkgk
 !
; ð2Þ
in which k 0 {w, y}. By assuming the composite good is the numeraire (py01) and letting
γy00 to focus on water consumption, we can simplify the above consumption bundle 2 to
qw ¼ gw þ
a
pw
I  pwgwð Þ ¼ 1 að Þgw þ a
I
pw
: ð3Þ
The main advantages of the Stone-Geary specification are that the estimated elasticities
are non-constant along the demand curve and it uses only two parameters which have
economic meaning. Specifically, α is the marginal budget share of water and γw represents
a threshold below which consumption may not be responsive to prices (see Gaudin et al.
2001; Martínez-Espiñeira and Nauges 2004).
In this paper, average price is treated as the price variable and is obtained as a
result of dividing water expenditure by water consumption. The average price, and not
the marginal price combined with the difference variable, is used because the cost of
water is relatively low compared to disposable income and the price system as applied
in Taipei is complicated. This price system consists of a fixed fee and five increasing
block rates. It is therefore impossible for people to know exactly the marginal price
Table 1 Descriptive statistics of variables
Variable Description Unit Mean SD Median Max. Min. Skew.
I Disposable income NT$ 206440 119086 180554 1386616 11762 2.01
WE Water expenditure NT$ 683.57 325.02 600 4000 150 1.99
α Expenditure-
Income ratio
(0WE/I)
% 0.41 0.28 0.35 4.96 0.04 4.36
qw Water consumption M
3 54.31 31.68 46.30 367.50 1.40 1.87
pw Average price
(0WE/qw)
NT$/M3 13.76 3.92 12.96 107.14 10.88 9.72
N Household size person 3.15 1.32 3 9 1 0.28
H House size M2 101.32 40.12 99.17 495.87 9.92 1.91
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level they are applying.14 According to demand theory, it is expected that the price
elasticity of demand is negative and inelastic due to the lack of substitutes for water.
Household income is expected to have a positive effect on water consumption because
water is a normal good. Estimates of income elasticity in the literature are commonly
small and inelastic.15
For the empirical estimation of water demand, the explanatory variables in general
include weather and seasonal factors, population and household composition, and other
control variables in addition to the water price and household income in Eq. 3 (see, for
example, the surveys of Worthington and Hoffman 2008 and Arbués et al. 2003). Here, we
explicitly consider two household characteristics, the number of household members (N) and
house size (H), as the explanatory variables for water consumption.16 Because water is
essential to life, it is expected that the coefficient of N is positive. That is, more family
members would increase the total water consumption of the household. The coefficient of H
is expected to be positive, too. This is because a household with a larger area may need more
maintenance efforts which consume water. It should be noted that climate variables are not
included because households in this area share the same climatic environment. The defi-
nitions and descriptive statistics of variables are presented in Table 1.
We conduct the OLS regression. The estimate of the water demand equation yields (t-
ratios in parentheses):
qw ¼ 14:577
6:962ð Þ
þ 0:00082
10:840ð Þ
I
pw
þ 6:465
11:926ð Þ
N þ 0:062
3:688ð Þ
H þ "; R2 ¼ 0:24 ð4Þ
According to the estimates, the subsistence level of water is calculated as 14:589
¼ 14:577 1 0:00082ð Þ=ð Þ cubic meters per household bimonthly and, equivalently, the
minimal daily water consumption per person is about 77.19 l.17 The estimated price
elasticity (ηp) and income elasticity (ηI) at the sample mean are −0.23 and 0.23, respectively.
They have the same magnitude and opposite signs and can be derived by ηp ¼ ηI ¼ a
^ 
14 One can see, e.g., Martínez-Espiñeira (2003) for the reason and comparison of applying different price
specifications.
15 Based on a review of 24 journal articles published between 1967 and 1993, Espey et al. (1997) indicated
that the price elasticity estimates range from −0.02 to −3.33 in the sample, with an average of −0.51. About
90 % of the estimates are between 0 and −0.75. Dalhuisen et al. (2003) reviewed 64 studies that appeared
between 1963 and 2001. The distribution of price elasticities has a sample mean of −0.41, a median of −0.35,
and a standard deviation of 0.86. The minimum and maximum values are −7.47 and 7.90, respectively. The
distribution of income elasticities has a mean of 0.43, a median of 0.24, and a standard deviation of 0.79.
Approximately 10 % of the estimates are greater than 1. A more recent survey paper, Worthington and
Hoffman (2008), indicates that price elasticity estimates are generally found in the range of zero to 0.5 in the
short run and 0.5 to unity in the long run (in absolute values); income elasticity estimates are of a much smaller
magnitude (usually) and positive.
16 The candidate explanatory variables to be considered in the Taipei sample include I/pw, N, H, the education
level of the householder (EDU), and the number of household members above the age of 65 (AG65). By using
the stepwise analysis in SPSS, EDU and AG65 are excluded based on the criteria that the probability-of-F-to-
enter is less than or equal to 0.05 and the probability-of-F-to-remove is greater than or equal to 0.1.
17 The minimal daily water consumption per person of 77.19 l is calculated by transferring 14.589 cubic
meters to 14,589 l first and then dividing 14,589 l per household bimonthly by 60 (days) and 3.15 (average
number of persons per household). There are different suggestions for the basic water requirement in the
literature. For example, WELL (1998) and WHO and UNICEF (2000) suggested a reasonable minimum as
being 20 l per capita per day; Gleick (1996, 1998) recommended an overall basic water requirement of 50 l per
capita per day. In Howard and Bartram (2003), 100 l per capita per day and above is the optimal access. In this
paper, this quantity of water is defined as q which cannot be traded under the PTS. It represents a reasonable
minimum of water consumption and is thus not conditional on household and house sizes.
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I pwqw=
 
, where a
^
is the estimate of α and I , pw , and qw are the means of I, pw, and qw,
respectively. The price elasticity shows that the water demand is not very sensitive to the
water price. This finding might be due to the relatively low water price and its small
variation in Taipei. In addition, small and inelastic estimates of price and income elasticities
are as expected because water is a necessity and life-essential.
The number of household members has a significantly positive effect on the water
consumption. The increase of one household member will result in an increase of 6.465
cubic meters of water consumption bimonthly, which is about 108 l per day. As to the house
size, the bigger the house, the more significant is the amount of water consumed. Each
square meter of area results in about 0.062 cubic meters of water being used bimonthly.
3.3 The Agent-based Water Rights Market and Income Distribution
Here, we simulate the scenario in which the PTS is applied in Taipei by using the agent-
based model. A “household” is defined as an agent. The Stone-Geary water demand
equation and bimonthly household data are used to calibrate individual household behavior.
The market-clearing water price is determined when total water rights Q
 
equal total water
demand, which can be formulated as the following equation:
Q ¼
Xn
i¼1
qi ¼
Xn
i¼1
qiw pwð Þ; ð5Þ
where qiw pwð Þ is the household water demand function which is represented by Eq. 4 and qi
is the water rights allocated to the ith household. For simplicity in analysis, we assume that Q
is rationed equally among individuals. In the status quo of the data set, the total amount of
water consumed is 107,808 cubic meters. Each person is allocated 17.241 cubic meters of
water rights bimonthly.18 Households will trade water rights freely. However, the basic water
requirement, 77.19 l per capita per day as estimated above, cannot be traded. We use the
Walrasian auctioneer to determine the equilibrium water price. The simulated equilibrium
price is 21.293 NT$/M3. This price is notably higher than the current highest level of block
rates in Taipei.
The average statistics of water consumption, water expenditure and its change, and the
expenditure-income ratio per household after trading by quintile are shown in Table 2. Note
that a negative figure of “Net expenditure from trading WR” shows that the household sells
its rights. Because a household with lower disposable income per capita indicates that on
average the economic condition of that household is relatively poor, we sort the trading
results by the disposable income per capita quintile to check the change in the income
distribution after trading. In the columns of “Sorted by PC I”, we see that the net expendi-
tures from trading WR for households with lower income per capita are negative. Thus, the
average poorer households play the role of seller and gain from trade.19 The income
distribution situation is thus improved. In addition, the water share is around 20 % for each
quintile.
18 There are 6,253 persons in the sample and 17.241 0 107,808/6253.
19 However, it should be noted that two households with the same income per capita but of different sizes will
benefit differently from trade. Because of the phenomenon of scale economies in water consumption, the
individuals in the larger household will enjoy a greater level of satisfaction than those in the smaller
household.
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We then sort the trading results by water consumption per capita. In the columns for
“Sorted by PC WC”, households with lower water consumption per capita can earn more
from selling water rights and households with higher water consumption per capita should
pay more to buy water rights. This outcome is compatible with the user pays principle.
3.4 The Simulated Market Price Elasticity
One of the advantages of the agent-based model is that it can be used to simulate different
scenarios but is based on the water-use behavior of households. In this subsection, we further
discuss the price elasticity under the scenario of changing the total quantity of water
supply.20
Suppose that there are 41 different scenarios where total water supply varies and water
rights allocated for individual persons vary correspondingly from 7.241 to 27.241 cubic
meters with an increment of 0.5 cubic meters.21 The Walrasian auctioneer is used to
determine the equilibrium water prices under these various levels of water supply cases.
The simulation results of the market equilibrium are graphically displayed in Fig. 2. Since
the equilibrium water prices are determined when total water demand equals total water
supply, the curve in the upper panel of Fig. 2 is in essence the market water demand curve.
We further transfer the levels of price and quantity to the logarithmic scale and present it
in the lower panel of Fig. 2 (note that lnpw is presented on the horizontal axis and lnQ is
presented on the vertical axis). By so doing, the slope of the curve is the price elasticity of
market water demand which varies along the demand curve. It is observed that, the lower the
total water supply, the smaller the water demand elasticity. When the total water supply
approaches the minimum water requirement, the absolute value of the elasticity will
approach zero. On the other hand, if water is supplied very abundantly, its elasticity will
asymptotically go to −1. This is because when Q goes to infinity, pw will go to zero.
Equation 3 will simply become the Cobb-Douglas demand function.
In addition, since the simulations have generated 41 data points, we can use these data to
run a double-log regression to obtain an average estimate of market price elasticity. The
estimated equation is presented as follows (t-ratios are in parentheses):
lnQ ¼ 12:982
223:21ð Þ
 0:449
25:887ð Þ
ln pw þ u;R2 ¼ 0:94:22 ð6Þ
The coefficient of ln pw , -0.449, represents the price elasticity of market water demand
for the above-mentioned varying range of total water supply. Moreover, a rough estimate of
the price elasticity for the status quo total water supply is −0.644.23 It shows that when the
20 Note that in practice the total water supply might change due to different weather conditions and the
consideration of environmental and ecological purposes.
21 As mentioned above, each person is allocated 17.241 cubic meters of water rights bimonthly. We take a
range of 20 cubic meters around this number to specify the simulation scenario. The number of 41 is arrived at
by the calculation: 41 ¼ 27:241 7:241ð Þ 0:5þ 1= . Correspondingly, the total quantity of water supply
varies from 45,278 to 170,338 cubic meters.
22 It should be noted that the data points applied here are obtained from the 41 market simulation scenarios.
They describe the relationship between the price and quantity of a market. Thus, the water demand equation is
estimated for a market and not for a household. As a result, the household characteristics, such as household
and house sizes, should not be included as the explanatory variables in Eq. 6.
23 It is estimated by using three data points: the status quo (ln pw, ln Q) and its two contiguous data points.
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market price rises by 1 %, the aggregate demand for water will be reduced by 0.644 %,
which is higher than that for individual households in absolute value terms.
4 A Further Discussion on the Application of PTS
In Section 2, we have described the basic institutional design of the PTS. Here, we
will further discuss its application and viability. We propose two possible trading
mechanisms for application: the centralized market and the ex-post market. Overall,
the transaction costs of the latter are lower than those of the former. In what follows,
we will first introduce the basics of these two mechanisms and then analyze the issue
of transaction costs.
(1) The centralized market
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Fig. 2 The market water demand curve
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Because the market participants are numerous households, the right market might be
designed as a centralized market where all of the trading is done over a computer network.
The whole trading procedure could be separated into trading and implementation periods. In
the trading period, the buyers (sellers) report the amount of water that they would like to buy
(sell) and the price they are willing to pay (accept). The demand orders are electronically
ranked by price from high to low to shape a demand curve and the supplies are ranked by
price from low to high to shape a supply curve. Then the market equilibrium price and
quantity are derived electronically. The buyers (sellers) that bid higher (requested lower)
than the equilibrium price buy (sell) the amount of rights they reported at the equilibrium
price.
In the implementation period, all households consume water according to the amount of
water rights they own. The total expenditure on the water bill is calculated by summing up
the net expenditure from trading (positive or negative) and the expenditure from the existing
pricing system for the rights allocated.
The compliance condition of the PTS is that households should not consume more water
than the amount of water rights they own. As water is an essential resource in people’s lives,
what then happens if the household consumes too much water? One of the compliance
measures is to design a “safety valve” which is commonly applied in the cap-and-trade
system of emission regulation. The safety valve is a pre-set price that the regulator offers to
sell rights in unlimited amounts at this price. When the price is set high enough, it is similar
to a per-unit penalty (see, e.g., Jacoby and Ellerman 2004).24 Therefore, under the PTS, the
violators should pay this high penalty price for the amount of over-consumption. In addition,
to mitigate the uncertainty in trading for households, some degree of over-consumption
might be allowable. The banking and forfeiture of rights should be considered as well.
(2) The ex-post market
Under this mechanism, the market equilibrium price (P*) is determined by the water
supply curve (S) of water utility and the actual total water demand of households (Qa) (see
Fig. 3 for a simple two-user illustration). When Qa  Q , the cap of total water supply, a
household pays the water expenditure for the right allocation q at P0 (the existing price
system). In addition, a household whose actual water consumption is greater (less) than q
pays (earns) for the over- (lower-) consumption at the equilibrium price. When Qa < Q ,
which means that total water is abundant, no trading is needed and the household pays for its
actual water consumption at the existing price. The PTS becomes a pure pricing system at
this time. In order to mitigate the uncertainty of P* (being too high or too volatile), the
regulator could set a safety valve as an upper limit P
 
. If P* > P , the monetary amounts
for over-consumption and lower-consumption are calculated at P .
Because the equilibrium price is determined after the actual consumption occurred,
households understand the allocation amount of water qð Þ , the rate structure (the lower
limit), and the safety valve (the upper limit), but do not know the equilibrium price ex ante.
To help households make better water consumption decisions, the regulator should provide
ex-ante and real-time information regarding the supply curve, climate data and weather
forecasts, water consumption history, and equilibrium price prediction.
(3) Transaction costs
24 The safety valve in practice also plays the role of an upper limit to the market price.
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By comparing the above two mechanisms, it is obvious that the transaction costs of the
ex-post market are lower than those of the centralized one. In a centralized market, because
households cannot normally know their actual consumption levels exactly ex ante or in real
time, this would usually lead households to make conservative decisions when selling water
rights. The consequence would be a very narrow and inefficient market. Under the ex-post
market mechanism, households use the predetermined information of lower and upper price
limits (P0 and P ), quota qð Þ , and the predicted equilibrium price to make their water
consumption decisions. They pay water fees on water bills as usual and do not need to
proceed with physical trades, and thus the trading burden on both the households and the
regulator is largely reduced.
In fact, in comparison with other commodities such as irrigated water, SO2 and CO2 that
have been practically traded under the cap-and-trade system, the transaction costs for
residential water market should be lower.25 In the residential water market, participants are
numerous small buyers and sellers who hold no market power, the product is homogeneous,
and the geographic domain of trading is smaller as well. Finally, if the water is really scarce,
the costs of resource-using inefficiency under the existing systematically-underpriced sys-
tem should be taken into consideration and be compared with the transaction costs.
5 Conclusion
Because some of the goals of residential water use are mutually conflicting, existing pure
price systems are, in practice, systematically underpriced. In this paper, we first propose a
25 For the transfers of irrigated water, there are two broad groups of externalities associated: return flow effects
and instream flow effects (Griffin and Boadu 1992 and Lee and Jouravlev 1998). In addition, changes in water
quality after trading contribute another trading barrier. For the SO2 trading, because SO2 is a non-uniformly
mixed assimilative pollutant, a simple one-to-one trading will result in the problem of hot spots. CO2 is a
uniformly mixed accumulative pollutant. However, trading globally, strategic behaviors, and the consideration
of equity between generations and countries make the transaction costs very high.
S
QQa =q 21q11q
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0P
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Q
Fig. 3 The ex-post market and the equilibrium
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price-cum-trade incentive system, the PTS, which supplements the existing price system
with a cap-and-trade measure to reconcile these problems. One of the PTS’s advantages is
that it forces everyone to face the correct price signal. Under the existing pure price systems,
the interests of all water users are the same—they do not prefer a higher water price. Under
the PTS, however, these common interests could be broken. Because the poor could save
water to sell and earn money, they do not need to protest against a higher price, while major
water users are now forced to face higher prices.
The cap on residential water use can be used in considering other values of water use,
such as environmental and ecological values among others. The market then works by itself
to reach the equilibrium. The government does not need to set the optimal price. Two
possible trading mechanisms, the centralized and ex-post markets, are proposed for the
actual application of PTS. Although some transaction costs will result from trades, the price
information provided by the trades is very important. It will induce people to use water with
a more conscious attitude. It also reflects the true value of a natural resource. Experiments
based on true trading deserve further research to help explore the PTS and reduce the
transaction costs.
Second, by applying the agent-based model and a survey data set at the household level
for Taipei, we empirically estimate the Stone-Geary water demand equation to calibrate the
water use behavior of the household. The estimated results show that household and house
sizes have significantly positive effects on the household water consumption. The estimated
price and income elasticities are −0.23 and 0.23, respectively, which indicate that water
demand is not sensitive to the water price and household income. The simulated market
equilibrium price at the status quo total water supply is 21.293 NT$/M3. This price is notably
higher than the current highest level of block rates in Taipei. In addition, the market demand
elasticity is higher than that for the household level and decreases as the total water supply is
reduced.
Third, the simulation results show that households with lower disposable income per
capita do gain from trade and the income distribution is improved after trading. On the other
hand, households with lower water consumption per capita earn more from selling water
rights and households with higher water consumption per capita pay more for buying water
rights. This outcome is compatible with the user pays principle.
Finally, when the water market works well, some derivatives such as options and futures
for water might be derived. These instruments could help reduce the uncertainty of water
availability. These topics and experiments based on true trading should be interesting for
future studies.
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